Resolving conﬂicts
of law arising
from same-sex
relationships
BY ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR HILLEL Y. LEVIN
Editor’s Note: This essay was adapted from Associate Professor Hillel Levin’s
article Resolving Interstate Conﬂicts Over Same-Sex Non-Marriage, 63 Fla.
L. Rev. 47 (2011).

A

s anyone following the news
knows, same-sex marriage is a hot
topic. President Barack Obama
declared his support for same-sex
marriage in 2012, the ﬁrst time a major
party’s presidential nominee has done
so. Public support is at unprecedented
levels, and the U.S. Supreme Court
is currently considering two cases
concerning the legal status of same-sex
relationships.
Although the Supreme Court could declare that all states
must recognize same-sex marriage, few observers believe that it is
quite ready to take that step. Thus, whatever the Supreme Court
decides, little is likely to change from the current status quo,
which is, in a word, confusing.

The Dilemma
A few states (what I call the “marriage states”) permit samesex couples to wed; some others (the “marriage-like” states)
instead offer same-sex couples alternatives that are functionally
identical to marriage, or nearly so, but under a different
name, like civil unions; still others (the “marriage-lite” states)
provide same-sex couples with only a handful of the rights
and responsibilities typically associated with marriage; and
the majority of states – Georgia included – offer no formal
recognition at all to same-sex couples.
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Over the next few years, as the country continues to grapple
with issues related to same-sex relationships, more states are likely
to experiment with these alternative models.
This state of affairs raises complex and novel questions for
courts, legislatures and other policymakers in a technical and
somewhat esoteric area of the law called conﬂicts of law.
What happens when a same-sex couple married in a marriage
state moves to a marriage-like state; or from a marriage-like to
a marriage-lite state; or from a marriage-lite to a marriage state
– and so on? Do they keep their rights and responsibilities? Do
they lose them as they cross the border? Does it depend, and if so,
on what? Consider these examples:
s ! SAME SEX COUPLE MARRIES IN -ASSACHUSETTS A MARRIAGE
state) and moves to Delaware (a marriage-like state). One
spouse is incapacitated and hospitalized. Can the other
spouse direct medical care and make end-of-life decisions?
Can he even visit his husband in the hospital? What if the
incapacitated spouse dies? Who inherits? Who assumes the
decedent’s debts?
s 4HE SAME FACTS AND QUESTIONS EXCEPT THAT THE COUPLE MOVES
to Wisconsin (a marriage-lite state) instead.
s ! COUPLE ENTERS INTO A MARRIAGE LIKE RELATIONSHIP IN
Delaware and moves to Massachusetts. Before ofﬁcially
getting married, they decide to split up. One member of the
couple wishes to marry someone else. Can she? Must she
dissolve her union in Delaware ﬁrst? If so, how and where?
s ! COUPLE ENTERS INTO A MARRIAGE LITE RELATIONSHIP IN
Wisconsin and then moves to Delaware or Massachusetts.
What rights, if any, do the members of the couple
automatically enjoy in the new state?
These are what I refer to as the marriage/marriage-like/
marriage-lite conﬂicts.
Resolving them is enormously important. As U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Robert Jackson argued in Estin v. Estin (334
U.S. 541, 553 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting)) more than 60
years ago, “[i]f there is one thing that the people are entitled to
expect from their lawmakers, it is rules of law that will enable
individuals to tell whether they are married and, if so, to whom.”
In a 2011 article in the Florida Law Review, I offered the ﬁrst
analytical framework for resolving all of these marriage/marriagelike/marriage-lite conﬂicts.

By comparing these marriage conﬂicts to other kinds of
conﬂicts that present similar patterns, I argued that forum states
should, to the degree possible, sever those elements of same-sex
relationships entered into in foreign states that are contrary to
local policy but accept the remainder.
This approach provides sensible, straightforward and fairly
comprehensive rules for addressing the marriage/marriage-like/
marriage-lite conﬂicts, and it also shines a light on how norecognition states like Georgia ought to treat same-sex couples
who have formalized their relationships in other states.

Current Approaches to Solving the Issues
The article began by reviewing the approaches taken by the
various states to these questions and demonstrating that the law
was in disarray.
For example, consider how states have resolved the most
straightforward conﬂict, that between a marriage and marriagelike state (when a married same-sex couple moves from a
marriage state to a marriage-like state). Analytically, states have
three options in confronting this problem.
First, they might treat the couple as married. That is,
although the forum state would not perform the marriage, it
could recognize and adopt the status afforded by the marriage
state as a matter of comity.
Second, they could decline to recognize the relationship
altogether. In other words, because the forum state does not
permit same-sex couples to marry, it could simply reject the
relationship entirely and maintain that the couple must formally
enter into the forum state’s marriage-like union if they are to
receive the beneﬁts of such a relationship.
Third, they could opt not to recognize the marriage as such,
but instead automatically provide the maximum recognition for
the couple afforded in the forum state. For example, a marriagelike state such as Delaware could automatically treat a same-sex
couple lawfully married in Massachusetts as though it had
already entered into Delaware’s marriage alternative.
Unfortunately, as my research showed, states have been all
over the map concerning this question.

“Over the next few years, as the country continues to grapple
with issues related to same-sex relationships, more states are
likely to experiment with … alternative models.”
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The various other conﬂict patterns – marriage-like/marriage,
marriage/marriage-lite, marriage-lite/marriage, etc. – raise even
more possibilities, and states are to an even greater degree split,
confused or unclear in how to resolve them.
The central insight in my article is that the conﬂicts presented
by the states’ differing approaches to same-sex relationships are
not actually novel, but that legal scholars and judges have been
looking to the wrong precedents.
The typical approach offered by legal scholars and judges
focuses on what are called the incidents of marriage cases.
These are cases in which an interracial couple, ﬁrst cousins or
a polygamous group married in a forum that permitted their
union, but litigation related to the union subsequently arose in a
forum that rejects such relationships.
It is easy to see why these cases are attractive to scholars
and judges as starting points for resolving
the marriage/marriage-like/marriagelite conﬂicts. After all, they too consider
conﬂicts questions arising
from different states’ marriage
recognition laws.
As I show, though, the incidents
of marriage cases are of limited
utility.
To begin with, they are
notoriously fragmentary and
inconsistent. Scholars have
struggled to make sense of these cases and to develop generally
applicable rules, and doing so is something like recreating a
complex statutory scheme by referencing a small number of cases
in which the statute was applied.
Further, scholars inevitably make contestable claims about
how to categorize cases and what to learn from them. These cases
are too few, too thinly reasoned, and too inconsistent to offer
much insight.
More fundamentally, the incidents of marriage cases are
not, on close examination, sufﬁciently similar to the marriage/
marriage-like/marriage-lite conﬂicts to reason from them. In
those earlier cases, the states’ possible approaches were strictly
binary – states either recognized the relationships in question
as marriages or they rejected them as nothing – whereas the
possibilities in the same-sex relationship context run along a
spectrum.
Therefore, mechanically applying the principles from the
marriage/no-recognition conﬂicts in the incidents of marriage
context to the marriage/marriage-like/marriage-lite conﬂicts in
the same-sex relationship context makes little sense and does not
comport with the technical doctrines of conﬂicts law.

Using Conflicts of Law Doctrines and Principles
as a Solution
I suggest that in a variety of overlooked cases, conﬂicts of law
doctrines and principles have developed that shed light on the
marriage/marriage-like/marriage-lite conﬂicts context.
First, consider a simple problem that arises with respect to
contracts. Parties sometimes enter into a contract in a foreign
state that contains a clause that a forum state adjudicating the
contract deems unenforceable and contrary to public policy.
Should the court in the forum state (1) put aside its objections
to the problematic clause on the grounds that it should give full
force to a sister state’s law; (2) reject the contract entirely; or (3)
sever the unenforceable clause and give full force to what is left of
the contract?
It should be immediately apparent that these possible
resolutions mirror the options we identiﬁed in the
marriage/marriage-like context.
In these contract disputes, courts often sever the
unenforceable provision such that the remainder of
the contract will be valid and enforceable. In other
words, the court will conform the contract, where
possible, to local law and policy. In so doing, a state
can uphold its interest in enforcing agreements
between parties while simultaneously afﬁrming its
opposition to the particular provision in question.
Consider a second example, this time from
family law. The states vary somewhat with regard to
precisely which rights travel along with marriage. Some states are
community property states, while others are common law states.
If a couple were to move from the ﬁrst kind to the second,
the latter would recognize the couple as married, but would
typically apply its own law were a dispute about the property to
arise. In other words, the mere fact that the forum state might not
recognize one aspect of the relationship is not enough for the state
to refuse to recognize the relationship altogether. Once again, we
ﬁnd the forum state rejecting that which conﬂicts with its policies
and embracing that which it can.
We can readily apply the lessons from these relatively
uncontroversial cases to the marriage/marriage-like/marriage-lite
conﬂicts context. Simply put, states should reject those elements
of a solemnized relationship that offend their public policy and
accept those that conform to it.
Thus, for the marriage/marriage-like conﬂict, the forum state
should refuse to apply the marriage label to the couple, but it
should extend all of the beneﬁts that it would offer to similarly
situated same-sex couples under local law. In other words, it
should treat the couple as having automatically entered into its
marriage-like alternative.

“[T]he states’ differing
approaches to same-sex
relationships are not
actually novel … ”
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“The truth is that even no-recognition states have laws that recognize,
or at least protect, some aspects of same-sex relationships.”
The same rule should apply in the marriage/marriage-lite and
marriage-like/marriage-lite conﬂicts cases. That is, the marriagelite forum state should not recognize the marriage or marriage-like
label, or even the full array of rights and responsibilities that the
couple attained under the foreign state’s marriage or marriage-like
scheme. It should, however, extend all of the beneﬁts that it offers
to same-sex couples within its own marriage-lite alternative and that
are subsumed within the marriage or marriage-like relationship into
which the couple already entered.
Similarly, with respect to the marriage-like/marriage conﬂict
(where a couple enters into a marriage-like relationship and then
ﬁnds themselves in a marriage state), the marriage state should
automatically treat the couple as though they were married.
Once again, the marriage state would simply be conforming the
relationship to local law.
However, with respect to the marriage-lite/marriage-like and
marriage-lite/marriage conﬂicts, the marriage and marriage-like
forum states should refuse to extend any recognition to the couple
that has entered elsewhere into a marriage-lite relationship.
This is because (1) marriage-lite relationships offend the policies
of marriage and marriage-like states, such that the state should not
recognize the marriage-lite status itself, and (2) the couple has not
shown any interest in undertaking the much more robust marriagelike or marriage relationship. That is, the marriage-like or marriage
forum cannot sever some piece of the marriage-lite relationship
that it objects to and thus leave some larger piece that it can
recognize; there is simply no equivalence in the relationships.
However, there is one critical exception to this rule: if
the marriage or marriage-like forum state would allow
individuals to enter into a contractual relationship
governing the speciﬁc right at issue independently of a
marriage or marriage alternative relationship, then it
should recognize the foreign marriage-lite relationship’s
granting of that right.
For instance, if the forum state permits individuals
to appoint someone to make end-of-life decisions
independently of marriage (as all states do), and if the
foreign marriage-lite relationship provides for endof-life decision-making, then the forum state should
afﬁrm that aspect of the relationship as a contractual
matter.
Finally, this approach yields important insights
even for states, like Georgia, that decline to recognize any
form of same-sex relationship.
The truth is that even no-recognition states have laws
that recognize, or at least protect, some aspects of samesex relationships.

www.law.uga.edu

Same-sex couples can provide for each other in their wills,
and these wills are respected in no-recognition states. Likewise,
no-recognition states respect legal agreements directing decisionmaking in the event of incapacity, contracts governing property
division and other private agreements into which same-sex couples
may enter.
Therefore, no-recognition states should automatically treat
couples who have lawfully entered into marriage, marriage-like,
and marriage-lite relationships in other states as though they had
entered into whatever private contracts would be included in those
unions and by forum law. That is, a same-sex couple that marries
in Massachusetts and moves to Georgia should automatically have
whatever rights and responsibilities Georgia independently allows
same-sex couples to privately contract for and that are inherent in
Massachusetts marriage law.
Of course, this is only a small subset of the rights and
responsibilities that accrue to married couples; but they are very
real nonetheless.
In my view, this approach is fairly intuitive and offers a more
comprehensive and straightforward approach than those offered
by others. But it will likely make very few partisans in the same-sex
marriage debates happy.
Those who wish to see same-sex marriage spread throughout
the country may well prefer an argument that every
state is required to recognize a same-sex marriage
lawfully performed in another state.
On the other side, some who oppose samesex marriage and other forms of recognition
may protest that my approach allows
a sort of “creep” in the recognition of
same-sex relationships, requiring states
that have expressly rejected same-sex
marriage to recognize such relationships
in some cases.
To partisans of these debates, I
simply suggest that conﬂicts law, given
its opacity, complexity and technicality,
is not the appropriate terrain on which to
ﬁght the marriage wars.
Indeed, I hope all states will recognize
same-sex marriage one day soon, but based
on equality – not through conﬂicts law.
Resolving these conﬂicts requires careful
attention to the most technical areas of
the law, creative problem-solving and the
application of common sense. In other
words, it requires good lawyering.
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